Friday, February 15, 2013

Human-Sex-Trafficking at the Super Bowl


The Super Bowl is the most watched sporting event in the world.  The commercial airtime during the Super Bowl broadcast is the most expensive of the year and the most popular singers and musicians have performed during the half time show in the past. However, the Super Bowl does not only attract its fans and viewers but also traffickers. The Super Bowl is known as “the single largest human trafficking incident in the United States,” as Attorney General Greg Abbott told USA Today in 2011.[1]According to Forbes, 10,000 prostitutes were brought to Miami for the Super Bowl in 2010 and 133 underage arrests for prostitution were made in Dallas during the 2011 Super Bowl.[2]This year was no exception. A multi-agency task force arrested 85 people during the week leading up to the Super Bowl XLVII held on February 3, 2013 in New Orleans. 


Many mistakenly conceive that the human trafficking is only an international issue. However, the estimation of the number of victims provided by the United States State Department suggests that the domestic trafficking of the United States is a legitimate concern. According to the State Department, between 14,500 and 17,500 victims are trafficked into the U.S. from Asia, Central and South America, and Eastern Europe, and many more are trafficked domestically within the United States each year.[3]

Human trafficking is a form of modern-day slavery. Victims of human trafficking are subjected to force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of commercial sex, debt bondage, or forced labor. More specifically, in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), the Congress defines sex trafficking as “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act, in which the commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age.”[4]

 At the federal level, the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which outlaws slavery and involuntary servitude protects the victims of human trafficking. In United States v. Kozminski, the 1988 United States Supreme Court Case, the Court considered whether involuntary servitude included psychological coercion within the definition of involuntary servitude but ultimately held that it did not.[5]However, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act enacted in 2000 expanded the definition of coercion to include psychological coercion. Later, Congress expanded the TVPA by allowing victims to pursue a civil action against traffickers, relaxing the definition of human trafficking and providing rehabilitative facilities for victims.

One legal scholar emphasizes that the state level anti-trafficking legislation can prevent trafficking more effectively than the federal statutory provisions mainly for three reasons.[6] In Our Backyard Slave Trade: the Result of Ohio’s Failure to Enact Comprehensive State-Level Human-Sex-Trafficking Legislation, Rocha argues that lengthy and exhaustive federal investigations often fail to prosecute traffickers. She further states that because criminal law is a state police power, individual states must design their own anti-trafficking legislation to address the needs of victims within their borders. Lastly, she argues that states can enforce anti-trafficking laws effectively by training local law enforcement officers who are much more likely to encounter victims than federal officers.

According to the studies done by Polaris Project, compared to 2007 when only twenty-eight states had anti-trafficking criminal statutes, as of July 31, 2012, forty-eight states, including the District of Columbia, have enacted anti-trafficking criminal statutes with sex trafficking offenses.[7] This improvement suggests that many states are responding to the growing concern of the domestic human trafficking. However, some states such as Wyoming, have yet to pass any human trafficking law. Because the number of human trafficking victims is only growing every year, proper measures must be taken to eliminate it. I believe that trafficking cannot be eliminated only by criminal enforcements. In addition to effective criminal enforcements, federal and state governments must offer social services and develop public awareness programs.

Minji Ku
Blogger, Criminal Law Brief


[1] https://www.oag.state.tx.us/oagnews/release.php?print=1&id=3202
[2] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/03/super-bowl-sex-trafficking_n_2607871.html
[3] https://www.oag.state.tx.us/oagnews/release.php?print=1&id=3202
[4] http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/fact-sheet-human-trafficking
[5] http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=487&invol=931
[6] Priscila A. Rocha, Our Backyard Slave Trade: the Result of Ohio’s Failure to Enact Comprehensive State-Level Human-Sex-Trafficking Legislation.
[7] http://www.polarisproject.org/what-we-do/policy-advocacy/current-laws

Tuesday, February 12, 2013

The Eye in the Sky: Domestic Aerial Drone Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment


The watchful eye of the American public has recently placed the Obama administration’s drone program in its sights.  The release of the Justice Department’s plan for targeted drone strikes on American citizens allegedly working for al-Qaeda has garnered considerable attention.  The staggering development of drone technology has dramatically increased the administration’s capabilities to execute strikes on specific targets abroad.  However, while the focus of most Americans is on drone surveillance and deadly strikes in distant countries, U.S. law enforcement agencies have been quietly expanding the use of drones for domestic surveillance. 


In February 2012, Congress passed the $63 billion FAA Reauthorization Act, part of which is designed to allow for the increased use of government and private drones in airspace previously reserved for passenger planes.  The FAA estimates that around 30,000 drones will be flying in U.S. airspace by 2020.

While most large metropolitan police agencies have helicopters and stationary cameras that are used for surveillance, drone capabilities far exceed those of the average traffic camera or police helicopter.  First, many drones are cheaper than helicopters, which will allow more police forces access to surveillance technology.  Second, some drones have powerful high-resolution cameras that can track people from extremely high altitudes, are capable of surveillance recording for long periods of time, and can record property details that are not visible to the human eye.

Generally, police are required to have a certain level of suspicion or probable cause before obtaining a search warrant.  But fear now stems on police abusing the extraordinary drone surveillance technology and overrunning Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizures.  It often seems as though the legislature and judiciary are the tortoise in the race against the technological hare.  New technology often develops at a rate that exceeds the justice system’s capabilities to keep up.  But despite their tortoise-like reputation, many state legislatures are getting ahead by taking action against possible infringements by government agencies on citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.  In its pre-session committee organizing meetings, the Florida legislature has been working hard to push a bill placing restrictions on the extent to which drones can be used for domestic surveillance in the state.  The urgency of the Florida legislature can likely be attributed to the Miami-Dade Police Department being the first domestic police agency to finalize a deal with the FAA for permission to fly drones for surveillance purposes.  But other states are catching on as well; legislators in Maine, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Missouri, and Virginia have already introduced bills designed to place restrictions on drone usage. 

Moreover, if history is any indication of the future, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will let the federal government trample on citizens’ Fourth Amendment protections.  John Villasenor, a UCLA Professor and Brookings Institute Fellow, looks to three Supreme Court cases from the 1980s to illustrate that the government’s use of drones for surveillance will not be without limits. 

In 1989, the Supreme Court in Florida v. Riley found that a police officer’s observation of marijuana plants in the defendant’s partially covered backyard green house did not constitute a search for which the officers needed a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.  The Rileydecision came on the heels of another Supreme Court decision, three years earlier, in which the Court made a similar finding.  In California v. Cirolo, the Supreme Court held that observation of marijuana plants by a police officer in a private airplane, without a warrant, at an altitude of 1,000 feet, did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.  However, the Supreme Court maintained that Fourth Amendment violations occur when police officers violate a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”  Finally, in Dow Chemical v. United States, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), upon being denied access to a Dow Chemical plant complex, took to the air by hiring a commercial areal photographer to generate an aerial map of the complex.  The Supreme Court held the photographs did not violate the Fourth Amendment since the images were of an industrial complex taken in publicly navigable air space.

While all three of these rulings favor the government, the Supreme Court did not grant the government a free pass to disregard the Fourth Amendment when it comes to aerial surveillance.  In Dow Chemical, the court noted that the expectation of privacy that accompanies a commercial industrial complex is not the same as the expectation of privacy in an individual’s home.  The Court went on to scrutinize the level of detail in the images of the Dow Chemical complex and emphasized that the pictures did not reveal enough intimate details to raise Fourth Amendment concerns.  The Court also distinguished between a unique high-resolution camera not available to the public and a conventional camera like the one used by the EPA, a distinction the Court will likely consider in a future case on drone surveillance.  Furthermore, as Professor Villasenor notes, the use of drone surveillance at high altitudes can easily be distinguished from Ciroloand Riley where warrantless police observations were made at relatively low altitudes with the naked eye.

But a January 2012 Supreme Court case, United States v. Jones, may be more indicative of how the current Supreme Court would treat a drone surveillance case.  In Jones, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the attachment of a GPS tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, without a proper warrant, then using the device track the movements of the vehicle for one month, constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  The Court held that the respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

However, the Court skirted many thorny issues regarding electronic surveillance by considering governmental trespass while placing the GPS device.  Nevertheless, in his concurring opinion, Justice Alito addressed the difference between short and long term electronic surveillance.  He concluded that in an age where technology is constantly changing citizens expectations about privacy, short-term surveillance might not infringe on our reasonable expectation of privacy, where secret monitoring for a long period of time­­­­––in this case four weeks––does infringe on our Fourth Amendment rights.  He wnt on to note that “where uncertainty exists with respect to whether a certain period of GPS surveillance is long enough to constitute a Fourth Amendment search, the police may always seek a warrant.”  Justice Alito’s reasoning may be a sign of the Court’s reluctance to accept long-term drone surveillance, and is certainly an indication that the Supreme Court recognizes the tension between the Fourth Amendment and new surveillance technology like drones.

The Supreme Court has no easy task.  With technology constantly evolving, it is hard to gauge what society’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” actually is.  Additionally, state legislatures need to be careful not to restrict the use of drones so much that police can not take advantage of the drones’ capacities to aid in search and rescue operations, diagramming crime scenes, or hostage situations.  However, with an informed electorate, the Supreme Court on notice, and state legislatures already taking action, it is unlikely that the United States will become the police state that some people fear.


Jared Engelking
Blogger, Criminal Law Brief  

 

Friday, February 8, 2013

Identity Theft: Can the Government Take DNA Material Without a Warrant?


There have been 302 total DNA exonerations in the United States since the first one took place in 1989.  Since 2000, there have been 289 post-conviction exonerations. DNA evidence is one area of criminal law that is always in the news.  Last week, on January 29, 2013, a former Ohio police captain was released from prison after fifteen years, when new DNA tests proved he was innocent of his wife’s 1997 murder.[1] The Governor of New York recently announced that he is expanding the state’s DNA database.[2] DNA evidence is becoming one of the most useful tools for criminal law, but at the same time has some controversy around it.  While there are wonderful benefits to DNA testing and having a DNA database, there are serious concerns with the collection practices of the government.

The federal government has an extremely broad statute, known as the DNA Act, which allows for the warrantless collection of a DNA sample from anyone arrested or convicted (including non-citizens).[3] The DNA samples are added to the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) and kept there indefinitely.  The same statute also allows the federal government to “use or authorize the use of such means as are reasonably necessary to detain, restrain, and collect a DNA sample from an individual who refuses to cooperate in the collection of the sample.”[4] Generally, most interested parties can accept the practice of collecting DNA from convicted offenders.  However, there has been much debate, and little resolution, over the collection of DNA from pre-convicted individuals.

Many argue that there are Fourth Amendment violations by collecting an individuals DNA without a warrant and without consent.  The Fourth Amendment provides that the government cannot perform a search or a seizure, without a warrant.[5] Opponents of across the board DNA collection argue that the government’s practice of taking DNA samples from arrestees without a warrant and without consent is a violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.  The Supreme Court has affirmed many times that Fourth Amendment right to privacy attaches to individuals not places.  Surely a person has a right to privacy in their biological material.  

Courts nationwide have found that collecting DNA samples qualifies as a search.  While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue yet, the 3rd Circuit, in Mitchell v. U.S., has ruled that it is not a Fourth Amendment violation to take a DNA sample from a non-convicted person.[6] Mitchell was arrested for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.  After he was arrested, but not yet convicted, the Government attempted to get a DNA sample from him.  They cited the DNA Act as their authority to take a sample. Mitchell claimed that it violated his Fourth Amendment right.  Although the lower court agreed with him, the Circuit Court held that “arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy in their identities, and DNA collection from arrestees serves important law enforcement interests.”  Based on this reasoning they did not believe it violated his constitutional rights to force him to provide a sample of his DNA against his will.

While it may be true that there is a government interest in collecting data on arrested and convicted individuals, is it true that this interest is more important than the right a person has to their most precious possession, their identity?  Does the government’s interest in cataloguing biologic material trump your right to ownership over your body?  

Bethany J. Peak
Blogger, Criminal Law Brief

Image by: Micahb37



[1] Jim Kavanagh, Police captain exonerated in wife's murder, freed from Prison, http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/29/justice/ohio-police-captain-exonerated, Jan. 30, 2013.
[3] 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/14135a.
[4] 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a (4)(a)
[5] U.S. Constitution, 4th Amendment, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/fourth_amendment.
[6] The 3rd Circuit is the highest court in the nation to rule on this issue so far. U.S. v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 2011). http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5305218544820005389&hl=en&as_sdt=2,9&as_vis=1

Tuesday, February 5, 2013

California: Finding a Balance Between Overcrowded Prisons and Prison Sentences

Since the 1980s, the United States has seen the prison population double.  While the United States has less than five percent of the world’s population, it has about a quarter of the world’s prisoners. [1]There are several reasons for this drastic increase, including excessive prison sentencing and imprisonment for minor crimes such as writing bad checks.

Until recently, the prison population kept growing until there was a notable decline in 2011, with state prison populations falling 0.9 percent.[2]Although, the same has not held true in federal prisons where there has been an increase of 3.4 percent.  The recent decline can be partially attributed to the holding in Brown v. Plata, a class action suit, in which inmates claimed a violation of the Eight Amendment due to a lack of medical services as a result of severe prison overcrowding.   In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held, that a population limit would be placed on California’s state prisons in order to remedy the violations of prisoners’  Eighth Amendment rights.[3] More specifically, the Court said that as many as 46,000 prisoners should be released.[4] Not surprisingly, after the 2011 decision of Brown v. Plata, “about 70 percent of the state-level drop was due to California.”[5]There have also been a slight drop of state prisoner populations in twenty five other states, but the restrictions placed on California is what have made this national decline so notable.

However, in January 2013, Governor Jerry Brown stated that since “the prison emergency is over,” the federal government should end oversight over the state prison system and allow for the state to once again determine how many prisoners to house in their facilities.[6]While the decision has brought about some notable improvements in medical care and the sleeping quarter of the prisoners, it has failed to address other important problems such as sentencing laws and rising crime rates.


In the Brown v. Plata decision, Justice Alito, stated in his dissent that placing such a restriction on the number of inmates in California could put the safety of the people of California in jeopardy.[7] Was this true?  Since 2011, counties have imprisoned “lower-level criminal for shorter periods or not at all, opting instead for probation, electronic monitoring or home detention” due to budget restrictions.[8] During the same time FBI statistics have shown that violent crimes and property crimes have risen.[9] But several public policy groups argue that even though the state has seen the biggest crime increase in twenty years, people are analyzing this data in an overly-simplistic manner since crime rates vary greatly by community.  The Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice states that “the best data available suggests that offenders and parolees who have not committed violent or serious crimes can be supervised at the local level without jeopardizing public safety”.[10]


Governor Brown’s suggestion that California be allowed to once again dictate the number of prisoners in prisons is not the solution.  However, if the Court’s decision was not sufficient to efficiently lower the number of prisoners in state facilities while at the same time decreasing crime, what additional measures should be taken?  Although the state budget is a major concern, alternatives must be looked at that do not violate prisoner’s constitutional rights and that still serve as deterrence for future crimes being committed.

Elizabeth Rivera
Blogger, Criminal Law Brief

 [4]http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2011/05/23/supreme-court-addresses-inhumane-conditions-in-california-prisons-orders-release-of-46000-inmates/









Friday, February 1, 2013

Retroactively Outlawing the Twinkie Defense


The “Twinkie defense” refers to a diminished capacity defense, in which a criminal defendant argues that he did not have the requisite state of mind at the time of his crime to be held accountable because of some mental defect or abnormality.  This defense was made famous in 1979, when an official in San Francisco entered the city hall and murdered both the mayor and another city official.[1] In that case, the defendant claimed a mental defect that caused a depression to form and manifest in an inability to resist eating junk food.[2] 

Nearly fifty years after that famous defense, the Supreme Court will hear a case involving the diminished capacity defense, and efforts to ban its use.  Burt Lancaster was charged for first-degree murder in 1993 in connection with the death of his girlfriend.  Lancaster, a former Detroit police officer, had a long history of mental illness.  In 1994, he admitted at his jury trial that he had killed her, but insisted he had been legally insane or suffered from diminished capacity at the time.  Despite the defendant’s claims, the jury found him guilty.  Following a reversal of his conviction based on problems with jury selection, Lancaster received a second trial in 2005.  For this trial, he waived his right to a jury and instead elected to have a bench trial, presumably because he felt he had a better chance getting the judge to look at the intricacies of the law than a jury.  

Prior to Lancaster’s second trial, the Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the statute[3]that allows defendants to present an insanity defense.[4]  That statute also allowed for a defendant to assert the diminished capacity defense.  The theory of such a defense is that “if because of mental disease or defect a defendant cannot form the specific state of mind required as an essential element of a crime, he may be convicted only of a lower grade of that offense not requiring that particular mental element.”[5]  In People v. Carpenter,[6]the Michigan Supreme Court held that diminished capacity was not permitted under the statutory framework for an insanity defense, even though that statute[7]had been enacted in 1975. 

At Lancaster’s second trial, the trial judge decided that Carpenter applied retroactively; so even though Lancaster was allowed to present diminished capacity as a defense in his first trial, he was no longer allowed to do so in this trial.  Being denied this defense, the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison.  Upon appeal, the Sixth Circuit Appeals Court overturned[8]his conviction in 2012, finding that Lancaster was denied due process of law because he was not allowed to present the diminished capacity defense. 

Because Lancaster appealed under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act[9], the court could only overturn the conviction upon finding that the trial court’s decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.  The Supreme Court has certainly agreed that basic due process requires that statutes give fair warning of conduct that will be a crime.  This is generally established precedent that is not particularly controversial.  When a state court unexpectedly overrules a consistent line of decisions in criminal law, then applies that decision retroactively, this will deprive the defendant of due process. 

The problem is that in this case, the statute in question never specifically addressed the defense of diminished capacity.  In fact, the legislature had never addressed diminished capacity, and the Michigan Supreme Court had also never confirmed that it was an acceptable defense.  However, it had been common practice to allow the defense to be asserted at the trial court level.  The appellate courts had in some cases even affirmed that diminished capacity is a legitimate defense available to the defendant.  Because of this, the diminished capacity defense has never been as firmly ingrained in the fabric of the criminal justice system as if it had been established by the legislature, or confirmed by the Michigan Supreme Court.  So did the Michigan Supreme Court change substantive law when it found that defendants could not assert diminished capacity defenses?  Or did it simply finally decide murky area of law that a defendant should have reasonably foreseen could be changed?

For the Sixth Circuit[10] at least, the Michigan Supreme Court changed substantive law.  In its opinion[11], the Sixth Circuit notes that diminished capacity had been asserted as a defense in Michigan since 1973.  Subsequently, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the statutory framework for the insanity defense included the diminished capacity defense.  As such, according to the Sixth Circuit, the statute enacted in 1975 did not substantially change the recognition of diminished capacity as a defense to criminal prosecution.  The Michigan Court of Appeals, in fact, continued to issue opinions concerning and upholding the use of diminished capacity as a defense through when Lancaster killed his girlfriend in 1993.  Because of these factors, including the Michigan Supreme Court’s implicit recognition of the defense, the Sixth Circuit found[12]that diminished capacity was a consistent line of cases.

The Sixth Circuit next considered whether the decision in Carpenter should have been foreseeable.  The Sixth Circuit found[13]that because the Michigan Court of Appeals had so consistently applied the diminished capacity test without a response from the Michigan Supreme Court, the defendant could not have foreseen that the defense would be overturned by the time he had his second trial. 

Because the Sixth Circuit found all of these things, it also clearly found[14]that the trial court’s decision that Carpenter applies retroactively was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.  This seems clearly substantiated if you accept the Sixth Circuit’s argument.  However, while there was a long history of application of the diminished capacity defense, that defense was never as clearly established as the Sixth Circuit claims it must have been.  The Michigan Supreme Court never confirmed that the defense was proper.  The legislature never passed a statute that directly established diminished capacity as a legitimate defense.  While not clearly erroneous, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion[15]is made far less persuasive than had one of these factors been in place.  That said, in this current Supreme Court climate, wherein the Court is understandably wary of applying decisions retroactively, it is hard to argue that the Sixth Circuit’s opinion will be overturned when it is reviewed later this year.

Bonnie Lindemann
Blogger, The Criminal Law Brief

[15] http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0201p-06.pdf